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Introduction and summary
Advances in the economic management of informa-
tion have worked pervasive change throughout the
world economy and its financial system. Change due
to the adoption of electronic computing and commu-
nications has been highly visible. Another kind of ad-
vance, in the design of organizations (including
financial institutions) to allow them to function well
in private-information environments, has been equal-
ly significant. In this article, I examine how both
types of advance affect a key sector of the financial
system: central banking. This examination focuses
on the following three areas.
First, I study the implications of innovation
induced by information technology in payment arrange-
ments for monetary policy objectives. Some observ-
ers have suggested that such innovations, including
the introduction of electronic money products or e-
money, may nullify the relationship between issuance
of money by the central bank and the price level.1 I
explain why I think that this will not happen. More
precisely, I explain why innovative payment arrange-
ments will not nullify the long-run identity between
the rate of money growth and the rate of increase of
the price level.
Second, I consider operational and design re-
quirements for electronic information systems to en-
sure the integrity and security of the financial system
(including central bank settlement of large-value pay-
ments). I conclude that an enlarged role for central
banks may be warranted. Specifically, to a consider-
ably greater extent than in the past, central bankers
need to understand themselves as customers and ad-
vocates in a market for information technology, where
the quality of goods and services provided by the
market, rather than only the individual choices of the
central bank itself, determines how high a level of in-
tegrity and security is feasible.
Third, I examine the meaning of, and requirements
for, transparency of central bank decision-making.
A central bank is usually said to be transparent if it
makes its decisions visible to the public. For exam-
ple, the Federal Reserve increased its transparency in
the 1990s when it began to announce the new target
for the federal funds rate immediately after the Fed-
eral Open Market Committee (FOMC) meeting in
which the target was set. I suggest extending the con-
cept of transparency beyond decisions per se to the
full range of information about the central bank that
is relevant to the formulation and implementation of
present and future monetary policy. I argue that the de-
centralized structure that establishes 12 Reserve Banks
as independent corporations enhances the transparency
of the Federal Reserve System.
Information technology, the payments
system, and monetary policy
Payments innovation as a central banking issue
Information technology is engendering rapid in-
novation in payment systems. E-money designed for
small-value payments is the family of innovations
within the past decade that is most visible to the broad
public.2 In addition, there are new technology applica-
tions that promise dramatic expansion of the applicabil-
ity of netting and related procedures for large-value
payments. The most conspicuous (albeit not yet oper-
ational) worldwide example is the continuous linked
settlement (CLS) system, which was designed in re-
sponse to market and supervisory pressure to reduce
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of a foreign exchange transaction and its comple-
tion.3 In the U.S., the Clearing House Interbank Pay-
ments System (CHIPS) has incorporated a sophisticated
trade-matching algorithm in its payments system for
making large-value dollar funds transfers. The new
protocol makes CHIPS settlement a closer substitute
for Fedwire, the Federal Reserves real-time gross
settlement system, as a way to transfer funds for
most purposes.4
Retail e-money is more similar to these large-
value payment innovations than may be apparent. As
typically conceived, an electronic-money product re-
sembles a check in being transferable prior to settle-
ment, although in detail, the e-money is a virtual bearer
security while the check is a negotiable instrument.5
An electronic-money product resembles a credit card
in giving the payee a claim on the issuer rather than
on the payor or drawer. What is new about e-money,
at least relative to recent payment arrangements, is
the combination of these two features. While the ne-
gotiability of a check is seldom used in practice because
each drawers ability to settle is not widely established,
e-money is envisioned to be routinely transferred be-
cause the issuers ability to settle will be public knowl-
edge. The familiar payment instrument (although no
longer used in most countries) that e-money will most
closely resemble, then, is a banknote.6 Banks used to
accept outside money (typically gold or silver coin, in
the old days) as payment for a paper certificate, the
banknote, that the bank would exchange for outside
money on demand. Someone who accepted a banknote
could pay it to someone else who would redeem it,
and the payor and payee would thus avoid the risk
and inconvenience of using outside money directly
for their transaction.
One way of looking at the common use of an in-
struments transferability is as a netting arrangement.
The issuer or intermediary accepts a payment from
the first payor and makes a payment to the last payee
to use the instrument, with an arbitrary number of in-
tervening transactions being settled without the issuers
direct involvement, but simply by transfer of the in-
strument. Moreover, the profitability of e-money, which
derives from the issuer being able to convert money
received in payment to an illiquid security with posi-
tive yield until having to make payment, relies on this
netting to forestall premature liquidation of the secu-
rity. From this perspective, e-money shares the same
main feature of economic interest of the large-value
payment innovations currently being developed.
With that preamble, I propose that increased
scope for net settlement is the predominant aspect
of payments system innovation that might raise a
fundamental issue of monetary policy.7 (This is not to
say that it would be the only aspect relevant for other
purposes, such as addressing prudential, competitive,
and consumer-protection issues.) By a fundamental
issue, I mean one that current understanding would
not provide a good way to address. Extensive conver-
sion of reservable deposits, or of deposits included in
a monetary aggregate, to e-money might be a serious
problem for monetary policy in some sense, for exam-
ple, but it would not be a fundamental problem, because
reformulation of the basis for computing the reserve
requirement or monetary aggregate to include e-money
would be an obvious solution. By this premise, a po-
tentially open-ended examination of the implications
of innovation for monetary policy can be narrowed
to an examination of the monetary implications of in-
creasing the scope of net settlement.
Several years ago, central bankers concluded
that the implications of payments system innovation
for the formulation and implementation of monetary
policy in the context of e-money were not fundamen-
tal.8 This conclusion was based partly on the argu-
ment that the use of money for small-value transactions
is insignificant for monetary policy. That argument,
of course, provides no assurance regarding innovation
in large-value payments. However, there were other,
independent arguments that reached the same conclu-
sion. The central bankers suggested that, in general,
as long is there is a way to induce demand for reserves,
and as long as the central bank can finance open-
market operations to affect the supply of reserves, con-
duct of monetary policy broadly along present lines
should remain feasible. Inducing demand might re-
quire some regulatory distortion if interest were not
to be paid on the reserves, and providing resources
for open-market operations might require funding of
the central bank with tax revenue (as is already done
in the UK) if interest were to be paid, but even such
measures were not generally viewed as serious obsta-
cles to the conduct of monetary policy.
The question that past discussion has not resolved
or even framed very explicitly is whether innovation
in payment arrangements might conceivably cause
the objective of monetary policy to change. Central
bankers view themselves as making a tradeoff be-
tween the avoidance (or control) of inflation and oth-
er policy objectives such as growth and full employment.
If innovation in payment arrangements were to reduce
the sensitivity of the economy to inflation, then cen-
tral bankers presumably should respond by giving
greater weight to those other policy objectives rela-
tive to the inflation objective.30 2Q/2001, Economic Perspectives
Two models of payments innovation and inflation
I discuss two economic models that purport to
address the effect of payment innovation on the wel-
fare cost of inflation. The first model suggests that in-
novation should reduce the welfare cost of a given level
of inflation. However, the model incorporates an as-
sumption inappropriate to studying this question. I for-
mulate an alternative model that suggests that the
welfare cost of inflation is unaffected by innovation.
I start off with a well-known model, according
to which payment innovation potentially can reduce
the sensitivity of the economy to inflation.9 This model
posits that transactions can be made by using either
money or an alternative, nonmonetary, technology.
The researchers who developed the model call the al-
ternative technology credit, financial intermediation,
or e-money. A buyers decision which technology to
use is based on cost minimization. The cost of using
money is the interest income that is forgone by hold-
ing money rather than an interest-bearing, but illiq-
uid, security.10 The buyers cost of using the alternative
technologycall it creditfor a particular transac-
tion depends on the seller. For any buyer, there are a
few sellersthink of them as being his immediate
neighborsto whom it is very inexpensive to estab-
lish creditworthiness, a few others to whom it is very
costly, and other sellers at every level in between. Each
buyer desires the differentiated goods of all sellers,
so he will use credit to buy from his neighbors but
money to buy from distant strangers. There will be
some critical distance at which buyers switch from
using money to credit.
Now suppose that, for every distance, the cost of
establishing creditworthiness to a seller at that distance
falls by half. Then, if the seignorage tax does not
change, the critical distance will double. Some pay-
ments that would have been made with money before
will now be made with creditin particular, those
payments from buyers to sellers who are located far-
ther away than the old critical distance but closer than
the new one. Such a fall in the cost of establishing
creditworthiness is how a payment innovation is rep-
resented in this model.
The utility loss due to a marginal increase in the
price of a good is proportional to the quantity of the
good consumed.11 More generally, the utility loss due
to a uniform marginal increase in the prices of a set
of goods is proportional to the sum of the quantities
of those goods consumed. An increase in the rate of
inflation (that is, in the seignorage tax rate) translates
into an after-tax price increase on all goods bought
with money. The upshot is that the fewer are the
goods that a buyer buys with money, the smaller is
the buyers utility loss from an increase in the rate of
inflation. Since innovation in payment arrangements
reduces the set of goods that each buyer buys with
money, innovation reduces the aggregate welfare cost
of inflation according to this analysis. An implication
would seem to be that, as innovation decreases the
cost of alternative payments technology and corre-
spondingly increases its use, central bankers should
care less about inflation and should turn their atten-
tion more to other policy goals.
The most satisfactory way of modeling an inno-
vation in payment arrangements is to represent it in a
general equilibrium model having the feature that
peoples willingness to accept money in exchange for
valuable commodities arises naturally as an equilibri-
um phenomenon, rather than being imposed by an ad
hoc constraint against goods-for-goods trades not in-
volving money.12 The foregoing analysis is best re-
garded as an essay to think in rough and ready terms
about how such a fully articulated model would work.
The analysis leans heavily on the premise that money
is not used at all in making credit payments. In con-
trast, actual credit is almost always nominal, so money
is essential to extinguish or settle it. Since the payment
innovations that are being made on the basis of infor-
mation technology are specifically means of econo-
mizing on the use of money for settlement, the purpose
itself must be important for understanding the inno-
vations. The observation that there is no debt-settle-
ment role for money in the model just presented
should be a warning bell about its appropriateness
for this use.
A more appropriate proxy for a fully articulated
analysis, I think, is to imagine a payment arrange-
ment as being a protocol according to which a buyer
can costlessly issue real debt (that is, make enforce-
able promises to provide specified quantities of goods
at future dates) to finance part of a purchase, but ac-
cording to which at least a specified fraction of the
value of the purchase must be paid in money. This
fraction corresponds to the netting ratio, that is, to
the ratio of the aggregate value of gross payments
settled via the arrangement to the aggregate value of
net payments made in money to effect settlement.
Thus an increase in the netting ratio of the economy
is a good representation of a payments innovation.
Now, as a rough and ready analogy, think of the net-
ting ratio as being just the traditional money multipli-
er with net payment playing the role of inside money.
The clear intuition from this analogy ought to be that
a payments innovation will raise the price level (by
increasing the amount of inside money) but have no
other effect. This intuition follows from the idea that31 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
money is neutral in the long run, that is, that an in-
crease in the stock of money may have transitory
effects on real economic activity but will have no effect
asymptotically. In particular, the long-run welfare
effects of monetary policy should be identical in the
post-innovation economy to what they were in the
pre-innovation economy. This is the conclusion that
I would expect a sound, fully articulated analysis to
yield. On the basis of this expectation, I do not believe
that innovation in payment arrangements constitutes
a fundamental change.
Requirements for integrity and security of
the financial system
Central banks have undertaken to promote the
integrity and security of the financial system infra-
structure, and a central bank is directly accountable
for the integrity and security of its own operations.13
Integrity means immunity from failure when operated
and used even under extreme conditions (such as during
a period of financial market volatility) but in good faith.
Security means immunity from failure due to attempted
impairment or bad-faith use by an authorized or un-
authorized user.
Major components of financial system infra-
structure have relied on electronic computing and
communication technology for several decades. In
most countries these components include, for exam-
ple, the real-time gross settlement system for large-
value transfers and the system of ownership registration
for government securities. Other components, such
as securities-market trading systems and systems for
assessing and documenting the credit quality of assets
intended for securitization are progressively becoming
dominated by electronic technology as well.
Old-fashioned requirements of security and in-
tegrity continue to be relevant in the context of elec-
tronic information technology. For example, physical
facilities have to be guarded adequately; the authori-
zation, execution, and recording of transactions ought
not to be done by the same person; and there must be
sufficient investment in maintenance and redundancy
of equipment to control the risk of mechanical and
electrical failures.
In addition, three features of electronic technology,
and of software in particular, create problems that are
new or much more intense than before. First, a soft-
ware defect is present in exactly the same form on all
machines that run the software, so that redundancy of
equipment provides no protection from such a defect.
Second, there is the problem that software tends to
be subject to dramatic failure on account of a defect
in any one of a profusion of details. For example, in
1985, when the number of distinct issues of U.S. gov-
ernment securities grew too large to be represented
by the address field in a program instruction (analo-
gous to the recent century-date-change problem, in
which the commonly used two-digit representation
of a year ceased to be adequate), the unintended be-
havior of the program had business consequences that
required the Bank of New York to borrow more than
$20 billion at the discount window of the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York.14 More important, this
episode highlighted the potential for serious disruptions
to the payments system and the financial markets, al-
though they were avoided in this instance.15 Third,
besides the problem of integrity in each of many in-
dividual components, these componentsoften pro-
grammed independently of one anothermust interact
in precisely specified ways in order to be compatible.
An example of what can happen otherwise was pro-
vided last year by the Chicago Board of Trade, which
temporarily had to suspend activity on its electronic
trading system for financial derivatives (called Project
A) because of such a system-programming problem.16
Project A is a demonstration project being conducted
by an exchange that is still mainly organized as an
open-outcry trading pit. If this suspension had taken
place on an exchange that relies primarily on elec-
tronic trading, as some of the worlds principal ex-
changes already do and others envision doing soon,
then there would have been an exchange-wide sus-
pension of trading with potential implications be-
yond the exchange itself.
In the past, central banks and other financial in-
termediaries often have programmed idiosyncratic,
proprietary systems suited to their individual needs.
The critical need for this software to perform accurately
and reliably, in view of the features that I have de-
scribed above, makes such an approach increasingly
risky and inordinately expensive as software becomes
highly complex. The preferable approach is to syn-
thesize a system by relying as far as possible on ge-
neric modules that are widely enough used to justify
(and to share) the heavy cost of exhaustive testing,
and that preferably have been used together in vari-
ous combinations sufficiently often that there is a
high degree of confidence in their compatibility. Be-
sides mitigating in the first instance the problems of
integrity that I have described, maintaining a system
of components in widespread, current use helps to
ensure that the most skilled technicians will be avail-
able (as both employees and contractors) to maintain
the system and to make prompt, effective repairs
when necessary.32 2Q/2001, Economic Perspectives
Following this modular-design approach means
depending more than previously on the general mar-
ket for software and software-operated information
services to meet information-technology needs. A ca-
veat regarding this dependence has to do with the un-
usually high premium that financial system customers
place on integrity and security. Constituting part of a
niche market in this respect, the financial services in-
dustry may sometimes not be a priority customer of
the software industry. The market for advanced encryp-
tion technology provides a case in point. The Digital
Encryption System (DES) has been widely incorpo-
rated as a security measure in financial system soft-
ware since its introduction in the 1970s. For most of
that time, DES has been regarded as a commercially
reasonable security measure for large-value transac-
tions. Progressively through the 1990s, however, ad-
vances in code-breaking techniques have raised some
doubt regarding the adequacy of DES encryption.
A more secure encryption algorithm based on DES,
the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA, infor-
mally known as triple DES), has been regarded by
experts for some time to offer a preferable level of
protection.17 However, despite this situation having
developed somewhat predictably as code-breaking
research continued and triple DES having been iden-
tified early as a reasonable response to it, the current
state of the market is such that conversion of a com-
puter system to triple-DES encryption remains a
costly and managerially challenging project.18
A parallel situation exists with respect to soft-
ware integrity. For example, current industry efforts
to ensure the interoperability essential to the modular
design approach envisioned above may not be strin-
gent enough to meet fully the needs of the financial
system.19 The financial system is likely to look to
central banks for leadership in working with the infor-
mation technology industry and its regulators (includ-
ing, perhaps, defense-related agencies charged with
safeguarding communications and other economic
infrastructure) to ensure that needs are met. Because
the character of that industry is heavily affected by
the special attributes of information technology as an
economic good, bringing the needs of the financial
system effectively to its attention is likely to require
considerable exercise of judgment and creativity, as
well as tenacity.20
Central bank transparency
As I mentioned at the outset, the economic man-
agement of information includes design decisions re-
garding the structure of institutions, as well as decisions
about the employment of electronic technology for
computing and communication. Central bank trans-
parency is an issue to which both kinds of decision
are relevant.
For purposes of this discussion, I call a central
bank transparent to the extent that it makes public the
information about itself that is relevant to the formulation
and implementation of present and future monetary
policy. Such information might include its objectives,
its understanding (in terms of both broad concepts
and specific formal models) of the structure economy,
its knowledge about the current state of the economy,
and its decision-making protocol.
This definition is intended to separate as clearly
as possible the issue of transparency from the issue
of intellectual decisiveness within the central bank it-
self. For example, if decision-makers within the central
bank are confused or divided at a point in time re-
garding the significance of unexpected developments,
then the publics inability to attribute a coherent view
of the economy to the central bank merely reflects
the true situation of the central bank, not any lack of
transparency.21
During the past decade or two, central banks have
espoused transparency to a substantial extent. One
reason may be that the electorate has grown to regard
this as something for which the central bank is account-
able, and that central bank independence is therefore
politically dependent on transparency. Another reason
is that central bankers have recognized that greater
transparency may favorably affect the scope of action
within which they can maintain credibility while re-
sponding to macroeconomic developments. This broad-
er scope of action may make monetary policy more
effective. I am not concerned here with the justifica-
tion of transparency, however, but rather with the
question of how to achieve it.
Some early research on this topic (for example,
Canzoneri, 1985) modeled transparency in terms of
disclosure by the central bank of its information re-
garding the economy. The advances in information
technology that have been the focus of the article thus
far make such a modeling perspective less convinc-
ing than it may have previously been. A central bank
does possess some private information (for example,
more timely access than the public to some economic
statistics compiled by the government), but large cor-
porationsparticularly multinationalspresumably
possess some information that the central bank lacks.
Thus, on the whole, central banks do not seem unique
in point of privileged access to information or to the
judgment of sophisticated market participants. Where
central banks may have been unique a generation ago
was in possession of techniques and equipment for33 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
sophisticated formal modeling and forecasting, which
was the province of a small community of central
bank experts and university researchers. Today such
econometric expertise is widely available to the pub-
lic. Moreover, in some economies, the dramatic growth
of financial derivatives markets and the concurrent
issuance of indexed and unindexed bonds (that are
approximately comparable in other respects) have gen-
erated price information that is available to the general
public and have facilitated the publics direct acquisi-
tion of accurate information about expectations, espe-
cially regarding inflation.22
A more recent approach to analyzing transparen-
cy, taken by Faust and Svensson (1998), focuses on
communication by the central bank of its objective.
Faust and Svensson base their work on a modified
version of a model of Cukierman and Meltzer (1986),
according to which the central bank has a preferred
solution to an inflation/employment tradeoff, and this
preference is private information. They informally
recognize that this assumption could be given more
satisfactory foundations by assuming, as in Wallace
(1984), that the public is heterogeneous and that mon-
etary policy can work to the advantage of some sec-
tors but to the disadvantage of others. The tradeoff
that the central bank intends to make regarding the
welfare of these sectors is its private information,
which the public must infer from the subset of eco-
nomic outcomes that it can observe.
My impression is that this focus on a private in-
centive is much closer to the gist of the actual problem
of transparency than a focus on private knowledge of
specific facts. Recall, however, that when I proposed
a definition of transparency above, I mentioned two
other domains of private information besides these
two. One is the central bankers understanding of the
structure of the economy and the other is their proto-
col for reaching group decisions. Despite the wisdom
of Faust and Svenssons decision to simplify their
formal model by focusing on objectives rather than
general understandings or decision protocols, trans-
parency in these other domains is equally important
and presents problems for central bankers that are at
least as thorny. For example, if a central bank has a
staff econometric model that is routinely discussed
when monetary policy is set, should the model be de-
scribed to the public and should its software even be
disclosed in full? Whether or not such an initiative
would do harm in any respect, I do not believe that it
would give an accurate or helpful picture of the over-
all thinking of the monetary policy committee. The
collective state of mind of such a committee would
better be described by Paul Feyerabends description
of the collective state of mind of a scientific commu-
nity as a whole set of partially overlapping, factually
accurate, but mutually inconsistent theories.23 How
does one accurately and informatively disclose such
a state of mind to the public? I can only hope to scratch
the surface of this question in this article.
There is one asymmetry in Faust and Svenssons
modeling approach that would disappear if a more
thoroughly game-theoretic approach were to be taken.
That is, they present credibility as an issue of the cen-
tral banks ability to make incentive-compatible dis-
closure of private information, while they present
transparency as an issue of the extent to which the
central banks information regarding its own objec-
tives (or, more generally, its type in the sense that I
have discussed above) is private or public. In my view,
this latter information is private and the publics abil-
ity to know it is highly dependent, exactly as in the
case of information about central bank actions, on
there being an institutional framework that gives the
central bank an incentive for accurate and informa-
tive reporting.
Discussion of institutional design to enhance trans-
parency tends to focus on specific proposals such as
the prompt publication of minutes of meetings where
policy is set. My sense is that such proposals rely for
their effectiveness on more fundamental structural
features of the central bank. To illustrate this idea, let
me cite a structural feature of the Federal Reserve that
I believe plays a most significant role in achieving
transparency: its decentralized structure. There are 19
persons, the seven governors of the Federal Reserve
Board and the 12 presidents of the Federal Reserve
Banks, who participate directly in the deliberations
of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC),
which sets monetary policy.24 A substantial part of
the ongoing analytical support of FOMC decision-
making is provided by the staffs of the Board of
Governors and the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York. However, the fully independent participation
of each Reserve Bank president is buttressed by the
presidents status as the head of a separately chartered
corporation that comprises, among other things, a re-
search department under the unilateral control of that
president. The autonomy that is built into this struc-
ture has produced, over time, open discussion of a
number of policy foundations and alternatives that I
believe might have received less or later exposure in
a more centralized institutional framework.
Several important examples from recent decades
support this case. Beginning in the 1960s, the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis conducted a sustained pro-
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of monetary aggregates as a basis for conducting mon-
etary policy.25 In the 1970s and 1980s, the Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis played a significant role
in developing general equilibrium monetary models
for policy analysis as an alternative to the macroeco-
nomic modeling approach that was then dominant in
the Federal Reserve.26 In the early 1990s, the Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland persistently made a case
that the benefits of bringing inflation under control
would not be fully garnered until exact price stability
had been achieved.27 These essays in analysis and
persuasion have been both more vigorous and more
open to public scrutiny than I believe they would have
been if they had been led by policymakers of equiva-
lent seniority, but operating within a more hierarchi-
cally organized central bank. In all three cases, the
advocates of heterodox positions within the central
bank have had to depend heavily on informed public
opinion, and particularly on the endorsement of econ-
omists in the academic community, to affirm the cor-
rectness of their views. Thus, the decentralized design
of the U.S. central banking system systematically
forces policy debate out into the open marketplace of
ideas, to the benefit of both the transparency of the
Federal Reserve System and the intellectual caliber
of the discussion. The history of the three initiatives
that I have mentioned, and of others as well, suggests
that this process succeeds in identifying and evaluating
significant new ideas and, where merited, progressively
infusing them into the policymaking of the central
bank as a whole, albeit usually not in the uncompro-
mising form that they initially tend to be proposed.
In my view, this sort of institutional design for the
central bank is an important complement to the various,
specific regulations (regarding, for example, the ex-
act timing and format of public release of minutes of
policy-setting meetings) that are usually recommend-
ed as means to achieve transparency and to ensure
that monetary policy is publicly accountable.
Other design approaches, adopted by various
central banks in recent years, have analogous roles in
providing transparency. The common feature of these
approaches is that, rather than attempting to achieve
transparency by mandate, they set in place systems
of incentives that result in an institutional culture of
transparency.28 Both a conducive culture and a clear
public mandate have a place in achieving transparen-
cy. Indeed, for the central bank to have an appropri-
ate institutional culture is probably a necessary
condition for a mandate to be effective.
Conclusion
Recent, dramatic innovations in the economic
management of information, and particularly their
application in the payments system, might seem po-
tentially to change the nature of central banking. On
close examination, however, these developments do
not significantly change the role or responsibilities of
a central bank. They do not render obsolete the estab-
lished body of knowledge regarding what constitutes
a well designed central bank and sound central bank-
ing practice.
Similarly, intellectual advances in understanding
how organizations should optimally be designed rein-
force established thinking about how a central bank
should be designed to achieve transparency. Indeed,
these advances provide a clearer understanding of
how the decentralized structure of the Federal Reserve
System contributes to the effectiveness of the U.S.
central bank and to the public welfare.
The one area where innovations in information
technology do seem to call for new understanding is
in the involvement of central banks with the technol-
ogy itself. Such involvement is required to discharge
both oversight and operational responsibilities. On
behalf of the financial system, as well as on its own
behalf, a central bank must manage problems that are
rooted in the structure of the information-technology
industry. Adept management is required to maintain
the integrity and security of a financial system that,
because of its scope and complexity, is critically de-
pendent on information technology for its functioning.
NOTES
1Money issued by the central bank is known as outside money.
Commercial banks and other such depository institutions also issue
money, in effect, when they make loans. This is known as inside
money. A requirement that depository institutions must hold re-
serves of outside money constrains their ability to create inside
money. Reserve requirements in the U.S. and some other coun-
tries are deposit reserves based on the value of deposits that a
depository institution holds, and in other countries are clearing
balances based on the value of payments that a depository insti-
tution makes on behalf of its depositors. In this article, money
means outside money unless otherwise indicated, and reserves
is used as a generic term for either deposit reserves or clearing
balances.
2E-money refers to a family of payment methods that include
stored-value cards and Internet cash designed for widespread
use. Payment methods designed for convenient purchasing from a
single seller, such as the fare cards issued by some public transit
authorities, are not within the meaning that is usually intended.
3The CLS system is described in Bank for International Settle-
ments (1998).35 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago
4De Santis (1998) describes the proposed system and its risk-
management implications. Marjanovic (1998) also provides a
brief description.
5A negotiable instrument is one that has a particular, named indi-
vidual as its beneficiary, but that allows that beneficiary to desig-
nate another person as beneficiary instead (typically, as payment
for a good or service received from the new beneficiary). A bearer
security is a financial instrument, such as currency, whose benefi-
ciary is whoever happens to possess it. Some types of e-money differ
from a literal bearer security in point of requiring proof of owner-
ship beyond physical possession. That difference is not material
to the analogy drawn here.
6That is, a bearer security issued by a bank and redeemable for coin
or other legal money. Wallace (1986) and Summers and Gilbert
(1996) have previously emphasized this analogy.
7Friedman (1999) and King (1999) suggest that extensive use of
information technology might make it possible in principle for
the private sector to operate a comprehensive settlement network
that would be wholly outside the influence of the central bank. In
that case, my premise would be violated. The gist of my argument
in this section is that, although it might seem that being able to
settle large gross payments with much smaller net payments is
tantamount to the situation that Friedman and King have in mind,
the implications for monetary policy may be materially different.
8Bank for International Settlements (1996) reflects some of that
discussion.
9The model is an elaboration of a cash-in-advance model of Lucas
and Stokey (1987) in which, for each trader, some goods are
credit goods that are exempt from the cash-in-advance constraint
that holds for the remaining cash goods. The elaboration is to
endogenize the cash/credit distinction as explained here. Such
models were introduced by Schreft (1992) and Aiyagari, Braun,
and Eckstein (1998).
10This foregone interest is seignorage that is captured by the gov-
ernment, which would have to issue interest-bearing debt to finance
expenditure if people would not accept money. Seignorage is thus
an implicit tax on holding money.
11This is Roys identity; see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), p. 40.
This principle is highly intuitive. For example, if someone purchases
five daily newspapers and one weekly newsmagazine a week, then
a penny increase in the price of a newspaper hurts five times as
much as a penny increase in the price of a magazine. This is evi-
dently true if consumption does not change. If the reader cuts down
to four newspapers a week, then he was getting just one pennys
worth of utility from the fifth paper beyond what alternative ex-
penditure of its price would have yielded (since he elected to give
it up when an extra penny was charged), so (on the simplifying
assumption that utility is measured in whole pennys-worth units)
he still loses a pennys worth of utility despite changing his bud-
get allocation.
12Freeman (1996a, b, and 1999) and Green (1997) analyze central
bank operations, and also clearinghouse operations closely akin
to netting, in this way.
13Such a responsibility is widely conferred to, and considered an
appropriate role for, central banks. Consensus to this effect is re-
flected, for example, in a series of documents issued under the
auspices of the Bank for International Settlements during the past
decade. Payment arrangements operated by private financial in-
termediaries (either directly or via jointly owned subsidiaries)
evidently cannot be supervised in isolation from the sponsoring
intermediaries themselves. Therefore, oversight of such arrange-
ments involves coordination between the central bank and the super-
vision authorities for various types of intermediaries.
14Statements of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, and J. Carter Bacot, Chairman and
Chief Executive Officer of the Bank of New York and the Bank
of New York Company, Inc., before the Subcommittee on Domes-
tic Monetary Policy of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and
Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, December 12, 1985.
Reprinted in U.S. Congress (1986).
15Statement of Paul A. Volcker, Chairman, Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System, before the Subcommittee on Domes-
tic Monetary Policy of the Committee on Banking, Finance, and
Urban Affairs, House of Representatives, December 12, 1985.
Reprinted in U.S. Congress (1986).
16Chicago Board of Trade (1999).
17In 1998, the Accredited Standards Committee X9 on Financial
Services, a U.S. financial services industry committee working
under the aegis of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI),
adopted standard ANSI X9.52, which specifies triple DES as an
interim encryption method for large-value financial transactions
until a more durable method can be developed. In 1999, the X9
Committee issued technical guideline TG-25-1999, which expresses
a consensus that (single) DES encryption no longer provides ad-
equate security for large-value transactions. An analogous guide-
line for U.S. government applications and public recommendation
for nongovernmental applications, Data encryption standard
(DES), Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Publi-
cation 46-3, was issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce/
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in 1999.
This guideline designates triple DES as an encryption algorithm
of choice and permits DES for legacy systems only. The NIST is
also in the process of adopting an Advanced Encryption Standard
that will co-exist with, and eventually supplant, triple DES.
18To provide adequate electronic security, conversion to triple DES
must be done in conjunction with other measures such as setting
up a cryptographic key-management system. For non-U.S. entities,
a further complication recognized by NIST FIPS-46-3 is that ex-
port of encryption systems deemed to provide commercially rea-
sonable security for large-value financial applications is subject
to U.S. export-control regulation.
19Summers (1999) raises this issue.
20Arrow (1974) provides a classic introduction to the issues of
market structure engendered by characteristics of information-
related industries.
21Transparency is relevant in other contexts besides monetary
policy, but I have qualified the definition in this respect to screen
off issues that involve special considerations (such as whether con-
structive ambiguity about the extent of the central banks will-
ingness to provide emergency credit is a justifiable strategy to
deter implicitly subsidized risk-taking).
22Roughly speaking, the interest rate premium of an unindexed bond
above an indexed bond of the same maturity provides a measure
of expected inflation from the present to the maturity date. Tech-
niques to extract information regarding expectations from asset-
price data are surveyed by Soderlind and Svensson (1997).
23Feyerabend (1978), p. 39.36 2Q/2001, Economic Perspectives
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